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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
COMMENTS
Airplane Crash Caused by Fatigue Crack in Propeller-Degree of
Care Required.-D'efendant company agreed to fly plaintiff,. a mining
prospector, and two employees to a designated point and return.- The president of defendant company, an experienced aviator, acted as pilot. Shortly
before taking off an inspection and some minor repairs to the plane were made.
When the plane was but a short distance up a propeller blade broke off causing the motor to tear itself loose, and the plane to crash-injuring the passengers. There was some question of whether or not a ticket was issued to
plaintiff limiting liability. Held: No such ticket was issued, however, an
agreed limitation of liability would have been valid. Although it was contended that it is the custom and usage in Manitoba, Canada, that passengers
assume all risk of injury while being carried by air, the court found that the
evidence did not establish such a usage because the notoriety and certainty
required were not proved. Apparently no higher degree of care is demanded
of a common carrier than of a private carrier for the former is not an insurer
of the safety of passengers except so far as reasonable care and forethought
can attain safe carriage.
The court invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, shifting the burden
of showing due care upon the defendant carrier. A careful analysis was
made of the defendant's rebutting evidence. This evidence established the
history of the defective propeller and proved that due care was taken in the
inspection and use of the propeller. After an examination of the facts it
was found that the propeller blade failed because of inherent defective design which caused an instantaneous "fatigue" break. The court also determined that the fatigue fracture was not perceivable to the defendant prior
to the accident despite discredited evidence that the motor was running
roughly in a previous flight.
The court said:
"It must be remembered that after all a flying machine is a tool which
man has forged to defy the laws of nature. Enough experience has not yet
been had to completely perfect its vital equipment."
In applying its test of negligence the court placed itself, not in the light of
what was known at the date of trial, but in the light of knowledge which
the defendant had or ought to have had on the day of the flight. Its ultimate
test for negligence was that the defendant must make reasonable provision for
the safety of its passengers:
to take all due care and to carry safely so far as reasonable care
and forethought could attain that end. 'Reasonable' provision should not be
extended to cover more than such provision as human foresight and scientific
knowledge can ensure-regard being had to the fact that aviation must necessarily be an adventure to which exceptional danger is attached."
Officials of defendant company were not deemed to have known that propellers
failed due to "fatigue" cracks nor could they have known, the court held, of
the inherent defect in the design of the propeller. Galer v. Wings, King's
[414]
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Bench, Manitoba, Nov. 11, 1938, 3 W. W.. R. 481; 1938 U. S. Av. R. 177;
C. C. H. Aviation Law Service Par. 1225.
The court's test of negligence and its discussion of "knowledge" of propeller defects brings to mind a recent case in a lower New York Court,
American Airways v. Ford Motor Co., New York Supreme Court, New York
County, Feb. 2, 1939; C. C. H. Aviation Law Service Par. 912.
In that case the Ford Motor Company agreed to install some high speed
equipment on six of plaintiff's planes, and to "make a complete inspection of
each airplane to determine all necessary and desirable maintenance work to
be accomplished." One of the planes, after inspection and maintenance work
was completed, took off with four passengers and two pilots. It crashed and
all lives were lost. It was found that the crash was caused by a "fatigue" crack
in the propeller hub which caused the propeller to be lost and the vibrations
thus occasioned tore one of the motors loose. The "fatigue" cracks were
propagated by tool marks on the inner surface of the hub, which marks were
discoverable upon reasonable examination. Held: The Ford Company possessed the knowledge of the grave danger inherent in such marks-contrary
-to the finding in the Galer case-and in failing to report their existence to
the plaintiff, was derelict in its duty. Ford Motor Company was held liable
for damages to the plane and for the sums paid to injured parties, if reasonable in amount. While plaintiff could rely upon Ford's proper performance
of its duty, plaintiff could not defend, as against injured parties, on the basis
of such reliance and on the dereliction of duty by Ford Company.
The court did not as adequately define the degree of care required of the
defendant company as was done in the Galer case and only in a negative
manner defined the constituents of the duty. It is interesting to compare
the defendant's duty in the Galer case with that of the corresponding party
in the Ford case.
CLAUDE E. LOVE, JR.
Airplane Crash-Negligence Based Upon Who Was Operating Dual
Two related cases handed down
Controls-Presumptions.-[Michigan]
last year by the Michigan Supreme Court raise interesting questions in the
field of aeronautical law. As a result of a crash in which both passenger
and pilot were killed two suits were brought against the administrator of the
pilot, one by the administratrix of the passenger' and the other by the owner
2
of the plane, a flying club, for damages to the plane. Both cases mhy well
be discussed together.
Defendant's intestate used the plane, as a member of the Club, taking
plaintiff's intestate with him as a passenger but without informing the Club
as he was required to do by its rules. The passenger was a licensed amateur
pilot and had been an honorary member of the Club. Not only were the
club rules violated with respect to taking a passenger up but contrary to
state s and federal 4 rules the plane was seen to execute acrobatic maneuvers at
1.

Madyck v. Shelley, 283 Mich. 396, 278 N. W. 110 (1938).

4.

Subsection 2(c) of Section 72 of Chapter 7 of the Federal Air Traffic

2. Michigan Aero Club v. Shelley, 283 Mich. 401, 278 N. W. 121 (1938).
3. Section 6(h) of the Air Traffic Rules of Michigan-adopted pursuant to
Act No. 53, Pub. Acts 1931, which allowed adoption or deviation from the United
States Air Commerce Act of 1926. Section 6 (o) of the Michigan Air Traffic
Air
Rules-preventing flight with dual controls when carrying a passenger,
Commerce Regulations §72(2a), 1928 U. S. Av. R. 406, Michigan Air Traffic
Rules §6(h)-acrobatics over congested areas prohibited.
Rules, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 407, adopted and promulgated by the Secretary of Coin-
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a restricted height with connected dual controls (after the crash the controls
were found to be intact and in good working order). Held: Recovery was
denied to both the passenger's administratrix and to the Club. The plaintiffs
were required to show negligence on the part of the defendant and for that
purpose to establish that the defendant was at the controls when the crash
occurred. It was impossible to presume that the deceased club member-pilot
was at the controls in view of the connected dual controls and in view of the
fact that the passenger was a licensed pilot. Plaintiffs failed to sustain their
burden of proof. A presumption that defendant was at the controls could
exist, the court said, only so long as there was no rebutting evidence to the
contrary, but when rebutting evidence is introduced the presumption disappears; it cannot be weighed with evidence.
It is notable that in the two cases both plaintiffs suffered damages without recovery. The trial-court in the suit by the Club allowed a judgment on a
bailment theory but the Supreme Court reversed since that contention had
not been pleaded. The Club might well have asserted that the relationship of
the Club 5 to its members was that of bailor and bailee and that the contract
had been violated by' unauthorizedly taking the passenger and infracting state
and federal rules. Whether or not the violation of the bailment contract
was the proximate cause of the injury would be a question for the jury.6
Furthermore, violation of the contract of bailment would be evidence of
negligence to be used by the administratrix of the passenger in proving her
claim. At any rate had the plaintiff Club used the bailment theory it might
have avoided the difficulties of presumptions upon which the cases turned.
The use of presumptions in aviation cases is valuable if properly controlled. Too often, as here, all occupants of the aircraft are killed and the
only available evidence is circumstantial. Of necessity when aircraft is
demolished and all persons killed, evidence can be obtained only through the
use of experts. Testimony of experts is no more than surmises and conjectures from fragmentary physical facts discoverable by an investigation.
The question to be answered is which type of proof is the more reliable, the
opinion of experts or presumptions? But the instant case is one in which
even the opinion of experts is not available. Will the law fail to mete out a
remedy because of the impossibility of proof ?
It might be noted that the presumption which the plaintiffs attempted
to invoke was not a presumption of negligence, but a presumption or inference, i. e., a means of proof, that defendant's intestate was piloting.7 Such
a "presumption" finds no parallel in our automobile or maritime law. At
merce of the United States in pursuance of 44 Stat. 570 (1926) 49 U. S. C. A.
§173(e) (1935), Air Commerce Act of 1926, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 333 §3(e).
•5. Much depends upon the legal relationship as between the members of an
unincorporated association and the property of the association as created by the
rules of the club, I. e., whether the members of an unincorporated association
are tenants in common of the airplane or whether they are joint adventurers.
In the former relationship one co-owner is a bailee for the other. 3 R. C. L. 84.
In the latter relationship one co-adventurer is the trustee for the other. 15 R.
C. L. 504. In either event an action is available for negligent destruction of the
property while in the bailee's or trustee's care.
6. It is the duty of the court to determine the degree of negligence to be
found in order to fix liability and the legal constituents of the degree of negligence, while It is the province of the jury to determine whether or not the bailee
was in fact negligent if "reasonable care" is the degree of care required by the
court.
7. It is Interesting to note that while the court would not presume that the
authorized pilot, defendant's Intestate, was in control, the effect of its decision

is to hold that since the passenger could pilot a plane It is presumed*that he
did exercise his ability. Such a result borders closely on a presumption that
plaintiff's Intestate was guilty of contributory negligence.
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present there exist presumptions of sanity, of a bailee's negligence, against
8
self destruction, of innocence and several others. Where there is rebutting
the
presence of a second licensed
evidence such as connected dual controls, and
9
On this point the
pilot, the rebuttable presumption properly disappears.
10
Michigan court held with the majority and the prevailing rule.
If a presumption had been allowed in either of these cases the one lawfully in possession of the craft would have been deemed to be in control of
and piloting the craft. Being in control he would have been responsible for
fulfilling a required degree of care. Under the rule of the Michigan cases
and the majority an almost conclusive presumption would undoubtedly arise
that a transport pilot was in control of an airliner at the time of a crash.
On the other hand, such a presumption would be weaker or non-existent in
the case of a crash while an instructor was giving lessons behind dual controls
to a student.
There would seem to be little harm in a presumption, a statute or a rule
making some person responsible at all times for the control and operation
of aircraft. The question then to be determined would be the more tangible
one, viz., whether the person in control was negligent either in his operation
of the craft or in his act of allowing another to operate it." Unless some
proper person can be held responsible for a plane at all times too often damages will be suffered without recovery in this type of case.
Insofar as the plaintiff Club was concerned, it would seem to be unimportant who was operating the plane since the passenger's presence was unauthorized and even if the passenger were at the controls that fact itself
might be evidence of the pilot's negligence. In the case of the suit by the
administratrix of the passenger, irrespective of who was piloting, the passenger's contributory negligence was an important factor which apparently
was not raised, and cannot be raised until responsibility for control is allocated. Such allocation can never be made if the attitude of the Michigan
Court is followed.
CLAUDE E. LOVE, JR.
Aviation-Agency-Unlicensed Principal of a Licensed Pilot.-In an
dction by the plaintiff for destruction of its airplane while it was. rented
to the defendant, the lower court directed a verdict for the defendant on the
,ground of a lack of agency between the defendant and the pilot of the plane.
As to the raisom d'etre of presumptions now recognized, see 5 Wigmore,
8.
Evidence (1923) 442. Experience and fairness have demonstrated that there are

instances in which it is requiring the impossible to burden a litigant with proof
of a fact and Is unfair to do so.
9. 5 Wigmore, supra note 8 at pp. 452-3. The majority of jurisdictions
so hold.

10. As a result of a passage from Greenleaf's writing, Greenleaf, Evidence
(1877) §34, a minority has sprung up which considers presumptions as matters
of evidence although, in fact, a presumption is a "rule about the duty of pro5 Wigmore 505. As a result of Coffin v. United States, 156
ducing evidence."
U. S. 432 and 162 U. S. 664 (1896), following Greenleaf's statement, it
was thought for a time that the presumption of Innocence should be weighed
with other evidence. But such a view was halted by Agnew v. United States,
Yet a minority of states clings to the view that a pre165 U. S. 36 (1897).
sumption Is evidence. See collection of minority cases in 95 A. L. R. 883. Heiner
v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932) Is an excellent example of creating a valid,
conclusive presumption by statute.

It

also stands for the proposition that con-

clusive presumptions may be weighed with other evidence.
11. The rebutting proof of connected dual controls and the fact that the
passenger was a licensed pilot would have gone to show that the pilot was or
was not negligent in allowing the plaintiff's intestate to handle the plane In

the manner in which It was handled. Or, on the other hand, It might aid in
proving the plaintiff's intestate guilty of contributory negligence.
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The evidence showed that the defendant rented the airplane for the purpose
of flying to the city of San Bernardino. The plane crashed on the return
trip, resulting in the death of a passenger and the pilot, Hague. The testimony of Paul Mantz, president of the plaintiff corporation, revealed: that
the defendant had telephoned to him the day before the crash, to rent the
plane; that, against his own wishes, the witness, Mantz, acquiesed in defendant's request that the latter be allowed to furnish his own pilot; that,
two months after the wreck, he talked to the defendant, and that they agreed
at that time that if the crash was due to the fault of the plane, the loss
should be borne by the plaintiff, but that if the crash was the fault of the
pilot the defendant would pay the loss. Held, that, in the light of this evidence, it was improper for the lower court to have directed a verdict for
defendant, since this evidence presented a factual situation from which
reasonable men could draw different conclusions. United Air Services v.
Sampson, 96 Cal. App. Dec. 29 (1938), as modified in 96 Cal. App. Dec. 197,
86 Pac. (2d) 366 (1938).
The defendant contended that the only inference which lawfully could
be drawn from the evidence was that defendant rented from the plaintiff
an airplane, and that the rental price included both an airplane and the pilot.
This argument is not impressive. Conceding that this inference must be
drawn it does not follow that an agency could not exist between the pilot
and the defendant. A glance in the field of motor vehicle law shows that,
though a car is rented out, including a driver, the hirer may be liable for
injuries resulting from the negligence of the driver, depending on the factual
circumstances."
In determining whether a driver of a car, hired with the car, is an agent
of the hirer or the owner, various factors that may be in conflict, are considered by the courts. Generally, in deciding this question the court looks
to see in whose business the driver was engaged;2 who has the right to
direct and to control the routine actions and movements of the driver in
doing the work;s and who has the right to discharge the driver.4 Ordinarily
1. In Burns v. Southern Pacife Co., 43 Cal. App. 667, 185 Pac.'875 (1919),
the court held that, whether the hirer of a car, including a driver, should be
held liable for the negligence of the driver was a question for the jury. See also
Terry Dairy Co. V. Parker,144 Ark. 401, 223 S. E. 6 (1920) ; Hooper v. Brawner,

148 Md. 417, 129 Atil. 672, 42 A. L. R 1437 (1925) ; Morss v. Murphy Transfer &
Storage Co., 170 Minn. 1, 211 N. W. 950 (1927) ; Isaacs v. Prince & Wilds, 133
Miss. 195, 97 So. 558 (1923), where the court directed a verdict in favor of the
owner of a car, on the basis that the driver was subject to the control and
direction of hirer, and that he was doing hirer's work; Braun v. Averdick, 113
Ohio St. 613, 150 N. E. 41 (1925) ; J4mmo v. Frick, 225 Pa. 353, 99 Atl. 1005
(1917) ; Dedman v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241, 291 S. W. 449 (1927) ; Olson v. Clark,
111 Wash. 691, 191 Pac. 810 (1920).
2. Braxton v. Mendelson, 233 N. Y. 122, 135 N. E. 198 (1922), where the
court said facts for the jury to consider, in determining in whose employ the
driver was acting, include payment of wages, right to hire or discharge, right
to direct where to go and what to do, and in whose business the servant was
engaged.
3. Dubisson & Goodrich v. McMullin, 163 Ark. 186, 259 S. W. 400 (1924),
where the court held, as a matter of law, that the hirer of a car, including a
driver, was not liable for the driver's negligence when the only control the
hirer exercised over the driver was to direct him where and when to go.
4. Densby v. Bartlett, 318 Ill. 616, 149 N. E. 591, 42 A. L. R. 1406 (1925)
McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 N. Y. 291, 125 N. E. 244, 8 A. L. R. 480 (1919)
and for other cases for interesting factual situations see: Billig v. Southern
Pac. Co., 189 Cal 477, 209 ,Pac. 241 (1922) ; Gornstein v. Priver, 64 Cal. App.
249, 221 Pac. 396 (1923) ; Janik v. Ford Motor Co., 180 Mich. 657, 147 N. W. 510,
52 L. R. A. [N. s.] 294, Ann. Cas. 1916A 669 (1914) ; Conroy v. Murphy Transfer
Co., 148 Minn. 14, 180 N. W. 704 (1921) ; Simmons v. Murray, 209 Mo. App. 248,
234 S. W. 1009 (1921) ; Schweitzer v. Thornpson d Norris Co. of New Jersey,
229 N. Y. 97, 127 N. E. 904 (1920) ; Lee v. Pierce, 112 Okla. 212, 239 Pac. 989
(1926).
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this is a jury question; and, in the principal case, where it was shown that
the pilot was engaged in defendant's business, where he was subject at least
partially, to defendant's control; and where the defendant had the right to
discharge him, the court properly held that the question should have been
left for the jury.
In Bird v. Louer5 a question arose as to whether the pilot was the agent

of plaintiff's intestate or of the owner of the plane.

In that case, the de-

fendant owner loaned the plane to the deceased upon the condition that it
should always be flown by the owner's pilot. The court (sitting without a
jury) held that the owner of the plane was the principal, since the pilot had
been engaged by the owner and the deceased had to accept him. In the
principal case, just the opposite was true. Here, the pilot was engaged by
defendant hirer, or at least it appeared that he would not rent the plane
unless the owner accepted Hague as a pilot. Another distinguishing feature
between Bird v. Louer0 and the principal case should be noted, in that in the
principal case the right of discharge was in the hirer, while in the former
case the right of discharge was in the owner of the plane.
In a petition for rehearing,7 which was denied, the defendant further
contended that, since he himself was not licensed to fly the airplane, Hague,
who was a licensed pilot, could not act as his agent in flying the airplane.
The defendant cited, in support of this novel argument, a California statute s
which states: ". . . it shall be unlawful for any person to act as an airman
in any capacity except that for which he is licensed under the laws of the
United States or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto .... ." The statute
made it a misdemeanor to violate its terms. It is difficult to determine
whether the court in rendering its decision treated the defendant as an airman or not. However, in either case the contention of the defendant cannot
be sustained.
First: Assuming that the pilot was an airman, defendant's argument
cannot be sustained. That an unlicensed person may be the principal of a
licensed agent is the generally accepted rule. The principal case had little
difficulty in refusing to countenance such an argument as here presented
and said :9
.. . we are asked by the defendant to hold that an unlicensed
person 10 or corporation 1 would not be liable for the negligence of pilots
5. 272 Ill. App. 622 (1933).
6. 272 Ill. App. 522 (1933).
7.
96 Cal. App. Dec. 197, 86 Pac. (2d) 366 (1938).
8.
Cal. Stats. (1929) c. 850, p. 1874, as amended by Cal. Stats. (1933),
c. 165, p. 615.
9.
United Air Services v. Sampson, 96 Cal, App. Dec. 197, 198, 86 Pac. (2d)
366, 370 (1938).
10. Morse v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Company, 170 Minn. 1, 211 N. W.
950 (1927) ; Dedman v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241, 291 S. W. 449 (1927) ; and see
Agency Restatement (1933), §19, comment d, p. 60 which says: "If a statute
requires doer of an act to be licensed, ordinarily a principal may employ a
licensed agent to do it."
11. In the following cases, courts have held that a corporation is liable or
may be liable under proper circumstances, for damages caused by the negligence
of a driver of one of Its cars. Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372, 291 Pac.
591 (1930)
Mitchem v. Shearman Concrete Pipe Co., 45 Ga. App. 809, 165 S. E.
889 (1932)
Magee v. Hargrove Motor Co., 60 Idaho 442, 296 Pac. 774 (1931)
Nelson v. Stutz Chicago Factory Branch, 341 111. 387, 173 N. E. 394 (1930)
Corbin Fruit Co. v. Decker, 252 Ky. 766, 68 S. W. (2d) 434 (1934) Joynes v.
Toye Bros. Auto d Taxicab Co., 11 La. App. 124, 119 So. 446 (1928) Snyder v.
Murray, 223 Mo. App. 671, 17 S. W. (2d) 639 (1929) ; Ashley V. Safeway Stores,
100 Mont. 312, 47 Pac. (2d) 53 (1935); Ianuzz4 v. Public Service Interstate
Transp. Co., 10 N. J. Misc. 1205, 163 Atl 31 (1932); Pridgen v. Holeman
Produce Co., 199 N. C. 560, 155 S. E. 247 (1930) ; Long v. Eastern Paving Co.,
295 Pa. 163, 145 At. 71 (1929).
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employed by it to operate the airplanes. ..

.

. Such a holding would be

analagous to saying that unlicensed employers of licensed elevator operators could not be held for the negligent operation of such elevators, and
that a person who himself was not licensed to drive an automobile could
not by his actions or conduct bring about the relationship of principal
and agent or master and servant between himself and a licensed chaffeur.12 Obviously, this is not the law."
The court in the principal case apparently thought the argument so naive that
it was not even disposed to cite any authorities to sustain its position.
Second: Assuming that the defendant was an "airman," the fallacy of
the contention that, because he was unlicensed, he could not be the employer
of a licensed pilot can readily be shown. The defendant apparently had in
mind the well-established rule, that an act which, if done by the principal,
would be illegal as in violation of common law or of some statutory provision cannot be done through the agency of another.13 But here there is
not a perpetration of a crime or an unlawful act through an agency, since
the pilot, Hague, was legally licensed to act as pilot.
However, some basis for defendant's contention may be found, although
the defendant does not clearly evince the theory behind his argument, to-wit:
that, since the statute requires an airman to be licensed, and since defendant
was not licensed, while the pilot was, such a statute would raise the pre-.
sumption that such a licensed person is an independent contractor. But the
rule seems to be well settled to the contrary; or at least courts have not
held that such a statute will raise a presumption that a licensed person acting
for an unlicensed person is an independent contractor. From a practical
standpoint, one readily can see that this presumption should not, and cannot,
be indulged in. Suppose, the court were to follow the contention of the
defendant? What would be the result? For example, in practically all
jurisdictions, an attorney must be licensed before he is permitted to practice
law. Following the logic of defendant's argument, we would find that no
agency relationship could be created between attorney and client, or at least
that there would be the presumption that, since an attorney was duly licensed
and since a client was not so licensed, then in all their dealings the attorney
was acting as an independent contractor. As the court in the principal case
14
said, "Obviously this is not the law."'
12. Morss v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Company, 170 Minn. 1, 211 N. V.
950 (1927); Long v. Eastern Paving Co., 295 Pa. 163, 145 Atl. 71 (1929)
Dedman v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241, 291 S. W. 449 (1927).
13. See Leonard v. Poole, 114 N. Y. 371, 379, 21 N. E. 707, 709, 4 L. R. A.
728, 732, 11 Am. St. Rep. 667, 672 (1889), where the court said: "Though an
act which, if done by the principal, would be illegal as in violation of common
law or some other statutory provision cannot be done through the agency of
another and any agreement authorizing or requiring an agent to do an illegal
act is void, all such persons actively participating are principals . . ."
14.

The following cases recognize the agency relationship between attorne

and client. Armstrong v. Ashley, 204 U. S. 272, 27 Sup. Ct. 270, 51 L. Ed. 482
(1907); Kast v. Miller & Lux, 159 Cal. 723, 115 Pac. 932 (1911); Wood v.
Claiborne, 82 Ark. 514, 102 S. W. 219, 11 L. R. A. [N. s.] 913, 118 Am. St.
Rep. 101 (1907) ; Sweeney v. Pratt, 70 Conn. 274, 39 AtI. 182, 66 Am. St. Rep.
101 (1898); Griffith v. Investment Co., 92 Fla. 781, 110 So. 271 (1926)
Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N. W. 410, 38 A. L. R. 814 (1924)
McNeal v. Gossard, 68 Kan. 113, 74 Pac. 628 (1903) ;Littauer v. Houck, 92 Mich.
162, 52 N.'W. 464, 31 Am. St. Rep. 572 (1892) ;Gibson v. Nelson, 111 Minn. 183,
126 N. W. 731, 31 L. R. A. [N. s.] 523, 137 Am. St. Rep. 549 (1910); Bury
v. Bury, 69 Mont. 570, 223 Pac. 502 (1924); Cram v. Sickel, 51 Neb. 828
71 N. W. 724, 66 Am. St. Rep. 478 (1897) ; Constant v. University of Rochester,
111 N. Y. 604, 19 N. E. 631, 2 L. R. A. 734, 7 Am. St. Rep. 769 (1892):
Chatham Lumber Co. v. Parsons Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241 (1926) ; State
v. Keller, 57 N. D. "645, 223 N. W. 698, 64 A. L. R. 434 (1929); Lambert
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Similarly the law is well settled that statutes which require that an
auctioneer,' s or real estate brioker,16 or an insurance broker,17 or an airman

be licensed' s do not raise the presumption that they are independent contractors or preclude an agency relationship between such persons and their
hirers.
However, in spite of the language of the California statute quoted, the
Federal Government does not and never has "licensed" airmen. They are
"certificated" as to their competency and are granted "certificates of competency." Therefore, in a close case, it is conceivable that the difference
between the "certificate" and the "license" concepts could make an independent
contractor on the one hand and an agent on the other.
LLOYD

Insurance-Interpretation

A.

RAICH..

of Participating in Aviation and Aero-

nautics with Relation to Passenger Coverage.-Several decisions rendered
during the past year add to the trend of authority and the more logical
rule that an airline or guest passenger is not "participating in aviation or
aeronautics" within the meaning of life insurance exclusion clauses. Artificial distinctions have been drawn between "engaging" (which does not
cover passengers) and "participating" in aeronautics (which does). Differences between "aviation" and "aeronautics" have been established and expressed.' Airline activity has realized tremendous progress since the early
precedent making cases were decided. Safety of air travel is assumed. It
v. Smith, 53 Okla. 606, 157 Pac. 909, 18 A. L. R. 1 (1916) ; Scottish Am. Mortgage Co. v. Clowney, 70 S. C. 229, 49 S. E. 569, 3 Ann. Cas. 437 (1904);
Riordan v. Britton, 69 Texas 198. 7 S. W. 50, 5 Am. St. Rep. 37 (1887) ; Gibson
v. Holmes, 78 Vt. 110, 62 Atl. 11, 4 L. R. A. [N. s.] 451 (1905) ; Allen v. Allen,
96 Wash. 689, 165 Pac. 889 (1917) ; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153,
66 N. W. 518, 57 Am. St. Rep. 899 (1896).
15. Williams v. Corker, 144 Cal. 468, 77 Pac. 1004 (1904)'; Greer v. Newland, 70 Kans. 315, 78 Pac. 835, 70 L. R. A. 554, 109 Am. St. Rep. 424 (1904) ;
Kennell v. Boyer, 144 Iowa 303, 122 N. W. 941, 24 L. R. A. [N. s.] 488, Ann.

Cas. 1912A, 1127 (1909) ; White v. Dahlquist Mig. Co., 179 Mass. 427, 60 N. E.
791 (1901) ; Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9, L. R. A. 1915B 151
(1914) ; Dunham v. Hartman, 153 Mo. 625, 55 S. W. 233, 77 Am. St. Rep. 741
(1900)
Randall v. Lautenberger, 16 R. 1. 158, 13 At. 100 (1888) ; Green v. Crye,
158 Tenn. 109, 11 S. W.
(2d) 869 (1928) ; Bamber v. Savage, 52 Wis. 110,
8 N. W. 609, 38 Am. St. Rep. 723 (1881).
16.
Anderson v. George L. Barney Co., 1 Cal. App. (2d) 340, 36 Pac. (2d)
717 (1934) ; Lesser v. Smith, 115 Conn. 86, 160 Ati. 302 (1932) ; Quinn v. Phipps.
93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 54 A. L. R. 1173 (1927) ; Dodd Grocery Co. v. Postal
Tel. Co., 112 Ga. 685. 37 S. E. 981 (1901) ; Manker v. Tough, 79 Kan. 46,
98 Pac. 792, 19 L. R. A. [N. s.] 675, 17 Ann. Cas. 208 (1908) ; El Reno Wholesale Groc. Co. v. Stocking, 293 Il1. 494, 127 N. E. 642 (1920) ; Cadigan v.
Crabtree, 186 Mass. 7, 70 N. E. 1033, 66 L. R. A. 982, 104 Am. St. Rep. 543
(1904); Hayes v. McAra, 166 Mich. 198, 131 N. W. 535, 35 L. R. A. LN. s.]
116 (1911) ; Kingsley v. Wheeler, 95 Minn. 360, 104 N. W. 543 (1905) ; Wolfersberger v. Miller, 327 Mo. 1150, 39 S. W. (2d) 758 (1931) ; Helfhat v. Whitehouse.
258 N. Y. 274, 179 N. E. 493 (1932)
Roberts v. Harrington, 168 Wis. 217.
169 N. W. 603, 10 A. L. R. 810 (1918)
See, also, Agency Restatement (1933).
§31, which expressly recognizes brokers as agents.
17.
Morris McGraw Wooden Ware Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co., 126 La. 32,
52 So. 183, 38 L. R. A. IN. s.] 615. 20 Ann. Cas. 1229 (1910) ; Sheridan v. Mass.
Fire d Mar. Ins. Co., 233 Mass. 479, 124 N. E. 249 (1919) ; Fredman v. Consolidated Fire d Mar. Ins. Co., 104 Minn. 76, 116 N. W. 221, 124 Am. St. Rep.
608 (1908) ; Arff v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 57, 25 N. E. 1073, 10 L. R. A,
609, 21 Am. St. Rep. 721 (1890) ; Monast v. Mdnhattan Life Ins. Co., 32 R. I.
557, 70 Atl. 932 (1911) ; John R. Davis Lumber Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
95 Wis. 226, 70 N. W. 84, 37 L. R. A. 131 (1897).
18. Famous Players Lasky Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal.,
194 Cal. 134, 228 Paa. 5, 34 A. L. R. 765 (1924) ; S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker,
42 Ariz. 503, 27 Pac. (2d) 678 (1933) ; Bird v. Louer, 272 Ill. App. 522 (1933),;
Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 347 Ill. 172, 179 N. E. 456, 83 A. L. R. 404
(19321
1.
Comments 3 Journal of Air Law 135, 311, 611 and Aeronautic Risk
Exclusion in Life Insurance Contracts, Fred M. Glass, 7 Journal of Air Law
305, 566.
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has always seemed just (and now, doubly so) to require insurance companies

to expressly and clearly state their intention if such it is, to exclude passenger aeronautical risks from the benefits of insurance policies.
Several recent decisions hold a passenger is not "participating in aeronautics" within the meaning of insurance policy exclusion clauses;2 further
that participating in "aeronautics" and in "aviation" are the same,3 although
one case-emphasized the difference between those two words as a means of
surmounting an otherwise binding state court decision.4
In Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.5 a more carefully
written exclusion clause denying double liability for "engaging in aeronautics
* * * either as a passenger or otherwise" had the effect desired by the insurance company-a guest passenger was held to be included thereunder.
The Missouri Supreme Court recently had a difficult task in interpreting
an insurance policy.6 The policy denied double indemnity "if death resulted
directly or indirectly * * * from operating or riding in any kind of aircraft
whether as a passenger or otherwise, except as a fare paying passenger in a
licensed passenger aircraft." Section 13 of the policy read: "This policy is
free from restrictions as to occupation" except military or naval service.
An airline stewardess, while being flown to a terminal to commence a scheduled trip, was-killed in a plane crash. It was argued that an airline stewardess must fly as a part of her occupation and, therefore, Section 13 had the
effect of removing her flying activities from the exclusion clause. The
stewardess, however, was a nurse at the time the policy was written. The
court held that it was that occupation to which Section 13 referred. Double
indemnity was denied-the exclusion clause clearly and unambiguously covered
all passengers except fare paying passengers. A different result may have
been reached if the policy was written while the insured was engaged as an
airline stewardess.
LEE A. FREEMAN.*

Municipal Airport-Legislative Immunity from Liability-Declaration
That Airport Is Public Governmental Function.-[Tennessee]
Action
against City for negligence in maintenance of municipal airport. Plaintiff

tripped over a loose wire. Liability denied. Validity of statute upheld, declaring municipal airport to be a "public governmental function" and prohibit2. Mutual Benefit Health A Accident Ass'n v. Moyer, 94 F. (2d) 906 (C.
C. A. 9th) Feb. 11, 1938-Cert. den. 304 U. S. 581.
(Commercial airline passenger) ; Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman 96 F (2d) 7 (C.
C. A. 8th) Mar. 15, 1938. Cert. granted on another ground-cause remanded
304 U. S. 549 and affirmed 99 F. (2d) 856. Cert. den. Feb. 6, 1939; (owner of
plane-but never acted as pilot or mechanic). Swasey v. Mass. Protective Ass'n,
Inc., 96 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 9th) April 26. 1938. Cert. den. 59 Sup. Ct. 70
(insured with two others had agreed to pay a sum sufficient to cover gas and
oil-held a passenger for hire and not covered by "participating in aviation or
aeronautics" clause; operation of plane or choice of route may be "participation") ; Marks v Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y., 96 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A.
9th) Apr. 26, 1938 ; Chappell v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 197 S. E.
723 (W.

Va.)

June 14, 1938.

3.
4.

Swasey v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, Inc., Ibidt
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, supra, note 2.

5.

197 S. E. 721 (W. Va.) June 14, 1938.

(A careful and complete analysis

of past decisions on this subject is contained in the court's opinion.)
6. State of Mo. ex rel. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Shatn, Supreme Court of Mo. Division 2, decided Feb. 21, 1939, C. C. H. Aviation Law
ervice, Par. 528.
* Of the Chicago Bar.
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ing any action against the City or its officers on account of the maintenance
and operation of an airport:' Stocker v. City of Nashville.'
s
A Texas decision invalidating a similar legislative exemption from liability for airport management was distinguished since the Texas statute did
not expressly declare that a municipal airport was a "public governmental
function." This basis of distinction is unconvincing. Legislative declarations
and findings of fact, while entitled to respect, are not conclusive on the
courts. 4 The courts have uniformly declared statutes unconstitutional which
sought to regulate private enterprises under the legislative guise and declaration that they were "public utilities" or "common carriers" or "imbued
5
In such cases, a
with a public interest," when in fact they were not.
factual issue was at stake, and the courts refused to be bound by legislative
fiat.
Whether a municipal airport is governmental or proprietary is likewise
a question of fact. The general classification of municipal functions into
proprietary and governmental is widely maintained to determine tort liability.
While it is generally held that a municipality in the exercise of a proprietary
function is liable for negligence and subject to the same requirements as a
private corporation and, in a governmental capacity, it is exempt from such
liability, yet the courts have failed to agree on the designation of most mu6
But these judicial differences are not an invitation to the
nicipal functions.
legislature to enter and, by legislative fiat, determine the "factual" issue.
7
The decMunicipal airports are maintained in a proprietary capacity.
laration by the Tennessee legislature that a municipal airport is a "public
governmental function" is not controlling or conclusive and, therefore, it
would appear that the Texas case of Christopher v. City of El Paso cannot
be distinguished from the Stocker case.

But what of the status of legislation that seeks to exempt municipalities,
their officers and employees, from tort liability while exercising a proprietary
function? Surprisingly little has been written on the subject. Statutes ex1.

William's Tenn. Code (1934)

Sec. 2726.22.

Code of Iowa (1935)
Similar legislation exists in several other states:
Sec. 5903cll "liability to be no greater than municipal liability with regard to
maintenance of public park." N. D. L. 1931 Ch. 92, Sec. 2. Property acquired
and used by city, county, etc., for airport declared to be acquired "for a public
purpose and as a matter of public need; and there shall be no liability * * *
Wis.
in connection therewith, or operation thereof, except to its employees."
City shall not be "held liable in damages for
Stats. (1937) Sec. 66.06(21).
injuries done to any person not an employe of such city by reason of the maintenance * * *" of an aerial landing field.

2. Tennessee Supreme Court, Decided April 1, 1939, Commerce Clearing.
House Aviation Law Service, Par. 1816.
3. Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S. W. (2d) 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
4. Block v. Hirsh, 266 U. S. 135, 154 (1921) ; Appeal of White, 134 Atl. 409
(Pa. 1926).
5. Producers Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 230
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 536
(1920)
(1923); Michigan Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 577 (1925);
State v. Smith, 31 Ariz. 297, 252 Pac. 1011 (1927) ; Mooney v. Tuckerman, 50
R. I. 37, 144 AtI. 891 (1929) ; State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So.
394 (1936) ; Dairymen's Co-op. Sales Ass'n v. Public Service Commission, 318
Pa. 381, 177 Atl. 770 (1935).
6. Municipal Liability In Tort-Tooke 19 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932).
166 (Cal. App. 1938)
(2d)
7.
Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, 84 P.
Christopher v. City of El Paso, supra; City of Blackwell v. Lee, 178 Okla. 338,
139
Ore. 137, 8 P. (2d)
City
of
Salem,
v.
(1936)
;
Mollencop
(2d)
1219
62 P.

783 (1932) ; Commented on in 3 Journal of Air Law 467 ; Coleman v. City of
Oakland, 110 Cal. App. 715, 295 Pac. 59 (1930) ; City of Mobile v. Latigue, 23
Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257 (1930), Commented on in 1 Journal of Air Law 365.
and 17 Va. L. Rev. 80. Contra: Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S. E.
63 (1936), Airport held comparable to a park.
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empting cities from liability for defective streets have been upheld, s but the
construction and maintenance of streets is generally catalogued as governmental. Liability for defects of streets presents a special and unique problem which is treated apart from other municipal liability problems by the
courts and, therefore, is of little aid or precedent here. Nor will we consider legislative immunity for exercises of governmental functions. 9
There are a few cases that either as dictum or as part of a general
discussion have said the legislature could expressly exempt municipalities from
any tort liabilityle Several constitutional grounds are available upon which
to force the invalidity of legislation which seeks to affect municipal immunity in the exercise of proprietary functions. A municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated as a private corporation; therefore, exempting
municipal corporations only would be favoring part of a class, in violation
of the equal protection clause. 1 Then again, a common law right of action
is a vested right, the legislative deprivation of which is a denial of due
process.

12

Several states

have constitutional

provisions assuring a certain

remedy for all injuries to person, property or character.-l

This provision
4

has been applied to invalidate a legislative exemption of municipal liability.1

Municipal airports serve public governmental purposes-in furtherance
of the national defense-as part of the postal system-and by reason of their
character as parks or parts of park systems. It may be desirable to limit
liability. Labeling an airport a governmental function to achieve that result
is not acceptable. The burden of liability could be avoided by leasing the
airport for operations tinder an agreement saving the city harmless from
all claims and expense. Protection can be realized by an insurance or indemnity policy covering this type of liability.
LEE A. FREEMAN.*
Municipal Airport-Protedtion of Airport Approaches--Zoning as Exercise of Police Power.-[Maryland]
Constitutional attack was made
against the Maryland Zoning law, which prohibited all buildings or struc8. Wilmington v. Ewing, 2 Pennilwell (Del.) 101. 43 At. 305 (1899) ; Morrell v. City of Phoenix, 16 Ariz. 511, 147 Pac. 732 (1915) ; Lee v. City of Dallas,
267 S. W. 1014 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Corpus Juris, Municipal Corporations,
Vol. 43, Sec. 1759; MaQuillin Mun. Corps. (2nd ed.) 1938 Vol. 7, Ch. 54.
9. The legislature has broad authority to impose or limit liability of municipal corporations in the exercise of governmental functions, or the maintenance of streets, and of state and federal agencies immune from suit except for
express enabling legislation. The two cases cited in the Stocker decision were
of that type: See Scott v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 199 N. Y. 178. 92 N. E.
393 (1910) ; Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 83 L. Ed. (Ad. Op.)
512 (1939), Collection of cases 89 A. L. R. 387.
10. Schultz v. City of Phoenix, 18 Ariz. 35, 156 Pac. 75 (1916) ; People v.
Chicago, 256 I1. 558, 563 (1912); Pardini v. City of Reno, 50 Nev. 392, 263
Pac. 768, 770 (1928).
11. Christopher v. City of El Paso, supra; City of Amarillo v. Tutor, 267
S. W. 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
12. Ibid.
13. Ore. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; Wis. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9.
14. Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Ore. 577, 65 Pac. 1066 (1901)-Immunity from liability for defective streets. Contra: Morrell v. City of Phoenix,
supra.

Another phase of this problem is the necessity of complying with legislative requirements of notice, etc., before bringing suit against a city. These requirements do not apply when action arises out of the exercise of a proprietary
function. Borski v. City of Wakefield, 239 Mich. 656, 215 N. W. 19 (1927);
Henry v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N. W. 664 (1913).
But see Contra:
Dickie v. City of Centralia, 91 Wash. 467, 157 Pac. 1084 (1916) ; Western Salt
Co. V. City of San Diego, 181 Cal. 696, 186 Pac. 345 (1919).
It is to be further noted that the question of liability for injuries caused
employees of the city was not expressly discussed. On this question, the Tennessee court might very well decide that the city was liable.
* Of the Chicago Bar.
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tures around public airports or landing fields above the ratio of 1 foot in
height to 15 feet in distance from the perimeter of the field, for a distance
of 3000 feet. The Baltimore Municipal Airport was individually zoned. Enforcement of the Act was placed in the State Aviation Commission. The
Complainant owned a parcel of vacant land adjoining the Baltimore airport.
A demurrer to the bill of complaint was overruled by the nisi prius court on
the ground the zoning law did not bear a substantial relation to the public
safety and welfare but was intended solely for airplane users and owners, and
therefore the police power could not be exercised. Further, that the restrictions imposed by the law against the use of property immediately adjoining
the airport amounted to virtual confiscation. Eminent domain proceedings,
it was pointed out, would be the proper manner of acquiring the airport itself
and of restricting the use of surrounding property.1 An answer was filed
and further hearings are now taking place.
The removal and prevention of obstructions to airport approaches is vital
to the proper and safe operation of aircraft. These obstructions may consist
of tall buildings, spires, towers, utility poles, wires and facilities, i. e., physical
interferences; and gases and smoke from neighboring industries which interfere with vision. Various methods have been pursued or urged as a means
of meeting this problem. 2 A large field could be established so that the
effective landing area would be removed from possible obstructions. Similarly, through the process of eminent domain, adjacent property could be acquired or limited in height and use to insure unobstructed airways. The
large sums that would have to be expended make both these methods objectionable. Obstructions could be marked-but then the danger would still
remain. The Federal government through the exercise of its commerce, war
or postal powers might cause the removal of aerial obstructions. Lastly, the
exercise of police power by the state or municipality, either through zoning
ordinances to prevent the erection of obstructions, or directly against existing obstructions as nuisances or hazards to public safety, has been suggested.
It is impossible to adequately discuss all or any one of the above methods
in this comment. We will only mention some of the legal problems arising
out of state or municipal efforts to use the police power as a means of
protecting.. (zoning) a municipal airport area from obstructions.
The zone and height limits of zoning ordinances or laws vary with the
size and character of the field, the type of traffic handled, and the altitude
of the airport with relation to sea level and surrounding land. Tentative
zoning standards for airport approaches have been promulgated by the Airport Section of C. A. A. and are set forth in a footnote.1
1. Mutual Chemical Co. of Am. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
and State Av. Com., Circuit Court No. 2. Baltimore City. Decided Jan. 25, 1939.
C. C. H. Aviation Law Service, par. 1813.
2. See admirable discussion in Report No. 42 of National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers, "Airports and Airplanes and the Legal Problems They
Create for Cities," April, 1939. pp. 7-20; "Unobstructed Airport Approaches."
Elliott, 3 Journal of Air Law 207 (1932) "Legal Basis of Municipal Airports,"
Grover, 5 Journal of Air Law 410, 428 (1934); "Airports and a Way by Necessity," Newman, 1 Air Law Review 458 (1930) ; "The Airport Approach," Rohlflng, 4 Air Law Review 144 (1933).
3. Approach and Turning Zones:
"For purposes of determining whether or not an existing or proposed structure, natural feature, or other object is or would be a physical obstruction or
hazard to the landing, or taking-off of airplanes at a particular airport, the
vicinity of the airport should be regarded as zoned for two miles in all directions,
as follows: (a) at each end of each existing or proposed runway, landing
strip, or other portion of the landing field used regularly for the landing or
taking-off of airplanes, an 'approach zone,' 1,000 feet in width at the boundary
of the field and broadening to width of 4,000 feet two miles distant, its center
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Zoning. statutes and ordinances already passed proceed either under the
authority of eminent domain (paying just compensation for property taken
or damaged) or the police power (no compensation paid).4 The 'classic
attack against zoning as a police power exercise, is that private property is
being taken (or damaged, as in some states) 5 for public use without just
compensation in violation of state constitutional provisions, or that the owner
is being deprived of his property without due process contrary to Federal
as well as State constitutional prohibitions. "Due process" in such cases
consists of just compensation for the property, or its diminution in value.
Zoning as-an exercise of the police power must have a substantial relation to the public safety, health or welfare.6 In the Baltimore airport case,
digested above, the court held that the public safety or welfare was not being
promoted by airport zoning but rather that a special class-airplane users
and owners-were benefited. This basis for the court's holding is faulty
although the result may be correct.
There is a very definite public interest, and public use of airports and
civil' airways, and, therefore, the institution of safety measures at an airport
would promote the "public" safety. Municipal airports are established and
maintained as a "public purpose" and "public enterprise" for which public
funds may be expended, bonds issued, debts incurred and the power of
eminent domain exercised.7 Airports serve as terminals and emergency landing fields for a large and rapidly growing form of transportation.8 The
establishment of municipal airports furthers the general welfare and prosperity. This was admirably stated by justice Cardozo in Hesse v. Rath9 as
follows:

"Aviation is today an established method of transportation. The future,
even the near future, will make it still more general. The city that is without
line being a continuation of the center line of the runway, landing strip, or
portion of the field In question; and (b) between each two approach zones, a
'turning zone,' such turning zone thus comprising all portions of the zoned area
not contained in approach zones."
Approach Zone Hazards:
"Within approach zones, there should be no building, structure, natural
feature, or object of any kind, the height of which above the level of the landing
field is greater than a certain fraction of its distance from the nearest boundary
of the field. This fraction should be 1/20 If the elevation of the airport above
sea-level Is less than 5,000 feet, and 1/30 otherwise."
Turning Zone Hazards:
"Within turning zones, there should be no building, structure, natural
feature, or object of any kind, the height of which above the level of the landing
field Is greater than a certain fraction of its distance from the nearest boundary
of the field. This fraction should be 1/7 if the elevation of the airport above
sea-level is less than 5,000 feet, and 1/12 otherwise."
4. A partial list of airport zoning ordinances and statutes Is quoted in
Appendices No. 3 and No. 5 of Report No. 42, footnote 2 supra.
5. Ill. Const. of 1870, Art. II, Sec. 13.
6. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S 365, 395 (1926) ; Yectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928) ; Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116,
121 (1928).
.
7. Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. (2d) 611, 51 Pac. (2d) 1098
(1935) ; Swoger v. Glynn Co., 179 Ga. 768, 177 S. E. 723 (1934) ; Wichita v
Clapp, 125 Ran. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928) ("The possession of the airport by. the
modern city is essential if it desires opportunities for increased prosperity to be
secured through air commerce").' Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S. W.
(2d) 1045 (1928) ; State ex rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220
N. W. 273 (1928) ; Hesse v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 .(1928) ; Schmoldt
v. City of Oklahoma City, 144 Okla. 208, 291 Pac. 119 (1930) ; McClintock v.
Roseburg, 127 Ore. 698. 273 Pac. 331 (1929)
("An airport owned by, the city
open to the. use, of all airplanes is for the benefit of the city as a community,
and not of any particular individuals therein. It is therefore a public .enterprise").; Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa.. 261, 151 AtI. 883 (1930).
that 8. See monthly releases of C. A. A. Release of May 4, 1939, announces
March,. 1939.. revenue .passengers carried -exceeds March, 1938. by 36.8%;
pouids. of .express-22.78%....

9. .249

N..Y. 436,.164,..N. .E 342 (1,928).
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the foresight to build the ports for the new traffic may soon be left behind
in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called the city of the blind, because its founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet.
The need for vision of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened
with the years. The dweller within the gates, even more than the stranger
from afar, will pay the price of blindness."
Municipal airports are available to the general public and may be used by all
qualified aircraft. They are at present used by private, commercial, mail, army
and navy planes and are "for the benefit of the city as a community, and not
of any particular individuals therein."' 0 In that sense there is a "public use"
of municipal airports. "Public use" does not mean use by the whole public
or political subdivision; the words only contemplate that all persons shall
have an equal right to use the facilities concerned, however few the number
who avail themselves thereof."
Other forms of transportation, such as
railroads and motor carriers are public utilities, and must demonstrate that
they will further and promote the "public" convenience and necessity before
receiving a certificate to operate. 12 The public they serve is the railroad "public" or the motor carrier "public" just as airports serve the airplane "public."
Municipal airports have been'held public utilities.'s A railroad or motor
carrier safety regulation promotes the "public" safety; so, too, must it be
held that the protection of airport approaches promotes the "public" safety
and interest.
But obstructions to airport approaches primarily interfere with the use
of civil airways. An airway is an air highway open to the free use of the
public in the operation of qualified aircraft.14 These airways have been
established by the Federal government and consist of elaborate air navigation aids in the interest of safe and dependable public air travel, e. g., radio
and light beacons, weather service, air markers and emergency landing fields.
Yet, the purpose of these safety devices is defeated by the existence of
dangerous obstructions around airports and in the path of established airways. Air safety devices resemble and serve the same purpose as traffic
lights, highway lights, directional signs and markers along streets and highways. In fact airways in many respects closely resemble highways. The removal of obstructions from streets and highways in the interest of their
free use for public travel, has been upheld as a valid exercise of police
power.' 5 Why not then the removal of obstructions in airways? Several
considerations, however, make us pause. First the rights of way for streets
and highways were acquired either by dedication or condemnation, structures
10. McClintock v. Roseburg, supra note 7.
11. Palmyra Tel. Co. v. Modesto Tel. Co., 336 Ill. 158, 167 N. E. 860 (1929)
Overlook Development Co. v. Public Service Com., 306 Pa 43, 158 AtI. 869, 87;2
(1932).
12. San Diego and Coronado Ferry Co. v. Railroad Com., 210 Cal. 504,
292 Pac. 640 (1930) (Ferry) ;Atchison T. d-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Com.,
130 Kan. 777, 288 Pac. 755 (1930) (Motor carrier in competition with railroad) ;
Oklahoma Union Ry. Co. v. State, 146 Okla. 92, 293 Pac. 537 (1930); N. Y.
Central Bly. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 123 Ohio St. 370, 175 N. E. 596 (1931).
13. Chandler v. Jackson, 121 Ohio St. 186. 167 N. E. 396 (1929); State
ex rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, supra, note 7.
14. Wichita v. Clapp, supra, note 7.
15. Cincinnati I. & W. By. Co. v. Connersville, 218 Ohio St. 336, 343 (1910)
(Railroad crossing) ;Eri, Railroad Co. v. Public Utility Com'rs, 254 U. S. 394,
409-410 (1921)
(Railroad crossing); County Court of Wyoming Co. v. White,
79 W. Va. 475, 91 S. E. 350 (1917) (telephnoe lines removed to further interest
of public travel in highway) ; Duquesne Light Co. v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 557.
97 Atl. 85 (1916)
(electric wires placed underground)
Michigan Tel. Co. v.
City of Charlotte, 93 Fed. 11 (Cir. Ct. W. D. Mich. 1899) : People v. Chicago
City fy. Co., 324 Ill.
618 (1927) (street railway tracks relocated to further

street improvement).
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that interfered with the establishment of the road were condemned and just
compensation paid. Civil airways on the other hand, are still in the process
of being established. The airway in a sense has been preempted and aerial
obstructions in the "right of way" are now sought to be removed-but not
through eminent domain as was the case with highways.
Secondly, obstructions removed from streets and highways were located
in public property, either without authority or else under franchise or other
authority expressly or impliedly subject to the exercise of governmental
functions in furtherance of the public safety. Aerial obstructions are located
on private property. The importance of this difference was emphasized by
the Supreme Court of the United States. While facilities in highways can be
removed and relocated to aid highway improvements for public travel,",
the same improvement will not warrant the uncompensatory removal of facili17
ties located on private property outside the highway right of way.
Thirdly, even though we have here sought to stress the effect of obstructions to civil airways, a Federal governmental function, nevertheless it
must be recognized that the removal of obstructions to municipal airport
approaches is an integral part of and improvement to the particular airport.
The field is not completely constructed and established until safe landings
and take-offs are possible at all times. It is generally held that the construction and maintenance of a municipal airport is a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental function.' 8 This distinction originated in
tort cases-but has been extended to determine municipal liability for the
removal of structures and facilities to aid municipal projects. A municipality
while constructing an improvement in its proprietary capacity is liable for all
removal expenses caused public utilities. 19 And this is so even though the
utility facilities are maintained in public property under franchise rights.
With this rule established there can be no doubt that owners of structures
and facilities on private property will be entitled to reimbursement for any
removal expenses caused by a municipal proprietary function. The fact
that a municipality owns its airport in a proprietary capacity will embarrass
the state when the state itself seeks to remove obstructions.20
Two lower courts have already decided that an adjoining property
owner may be restrained from erecting "spite" obstructions adjacent to an
16.
17.

Ibid.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Highway Commission, 294 U. S.

613 (1935) (highway commission sought to remove pipe lines to promote safety
of public travel on highway).
18. See comment in this issue on Stocker v. City of Nashville, Tennessee
Supreme Court. C. C. H. Aviation Law Service, Par. 1816.
19. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles G. A L. Co., 251 U. S. 32 (1919) (city could
not order removal of electric facilities to enable establishment of municipal
electric system) ;Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. San Francisco, 53 Cal. App. 188, 199
Pac. 1108 (1921), Cert. den., 257 U. S. 648 (attempt to force removal of manholes leading to electric conduits to facilitate extension of municipal street
railway) ; N. Y. v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 278 N. Y. 9, 14 N. E. (2d) 831 (1938) (removal of underground telephone facilities to accommodate municipal subway
construction) ; N. Y. Queens El. L. A P. Co. v. City of N. Y., 221 App. Div. 644,
224 N. Y. S. 564 (1927) (removal of poles and wires to accommodate municipal
rapid transit line) ; Milwaukee El. Ry. & L. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 209 Wis.
656, 245 N. W. 856 (1932)
(removal of underground electric facilities to accommodate municipal water plant construction); Alabama Power Co. v. City
of Guntersville, 183 So. 396 (Ala. 1938) (private and municipal electric systems) ;City of N. Y. v. Davis, 7 Fed. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925) (removal of
electric railroad overhead facilities to accommodate municipal rapid transit).
When acting In a governmental capacity municipality Is not liable for removal
expenses: New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Commission of Now Orleans,
197 U. S. 453 (1905) (relocation of gas mains to accommodate sewage system) ;
Transit Com.'€v. Long Island Railroad Company, 253 N. Y. 345, 171 N. E. 565,
566 (1930).
20. Supra, note 18.
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airport21 Courts of last resort may sustain that principle, but it is doubtful
whether they would go further and validate the removal of air hazardsbuildings and structures on private property-as an exercise of police power.
Such activity takes or damages private property for public use for which
just compensation is constitutionally required.
We have reviewed some of the legal difficulties of removing already
established aerial obstructions under the guise of police power. We now
turn briefly to an analysis of police power zoning against the future erection
of obstructions.
The doctrinal distinction between the exercise of eminent domain and
the police power is slight. To be valid both powers must tend to promote
the public health, safety and general welfare. 22 Mr. Justice Holmes set
forth the dangers of a too glib acceptance of police power to meet a public
necessity and the overlapping of eminent domain and police power thusly:
"As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One
fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude in most if not in all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
So the question depends upon the particular facts. * * *
"We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change. * * * This is a ques23
tion of degree."
21. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Von Bestecki, 30 Pa. Dist. Co. Rep.
137, C. C. H. Aviation Law Service, Par. 1808 (1937) ; Tucker v. United Air
Lines, Inc. and City of Iowa City, Dist. Ct. of Johnson County, Iowa, 1936 U. S.
Av. R. 10 6 Journal of Air Law 622, 7 Journal of Air Law 293.
22. Williams, The Law of City Planning and Zoning (1922).
On page 25
the author discusses the differences between eminent domain and the police
power as follows:
"For a statute or other governmental act to be a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain or of the police power, it is evident * * * that it must
in either case tend to promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. What, then, is the line of difference between these two powers? The
analyses of the cases seems to show that it is largely one of degree. Is it reasonable and proper, under all the circumstances, that the public good sought
should be attained without compensation to those whose rights are to be limited
to this end? If, on the whole, those affected are benefited by the measure, if
the right surrendered can no longer, in the light of advancing public opinion,
be retained in its fullness by its present predecessor, if the sacrifice to him is
slight or if the number affected is great, so that compensation is impracticable
-in all such cases compensation Is not provided for; otherwise the law demands
it. In the decision, history, custom, opinion, as well as surrounding circumstances, play their part."
(Emphasis supplied.)
23. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413, 416 (1932).
On
another occasion Mr. Justice Holmes said: "the fact that the constitutional
requirement of compensation when property Is taken cannot be pressed to its
grammatical extreme; that property rights may be taken for public purposes
without pay if you do not take too much; that some play must be allowed to
the Joints if the machine Is to work. But police power often Is used in a wide
sense to cover and, as I said, to apologize for the general power of the legislature to make a part of the community uncomfortable by a change." Dissent in
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 446 (1927).
The intensity of public
interest and danger will often determine the validity of attempts to exercise
the police power. In Nashville C. and St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405
(1935) the court stressed social and economic considerations as a weight of
public Interest-and as a reason for limiting the railroads' obligation to eliminate highway crossings by means of grade separations. At the same time
an attempt to impose removal expense on a pipe line company in furtherance
of a highway safety project was Invalidated: Panhandle Bastern Pipe Line Co.
v. Highway Comm., 8upra, note 17, although the Brie Railroad case, supra,
note 15 and other cases requiring railroads to further highway safety at their
partial expense was distinguished on the ground that:
"the authority of the
railroads to projects their moving masses across thoroughfares must be taken
to be subject to * * * be cut down whenever and as far as the safety of the
public requires"-the danger of railroads was greater than pipe line companies.
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The difficulty of distinguishing between these two forms of governmental
power is prominently displayed in zoning cases.
Zoning has been upheld when exercised to promote community prosperity
and the public welfare. 24 Airports promote prosperity and the community
welfare.2 5 Types of zoning analogous to the airport approach requirements
have been validated including: the establishment of building setbacks; the
restriction of the height of buildings and structures; the prohibition of certain types of commercial establishments and industries within a specified
distance of schools, churches and hospitals; the establishment of use, height
and area districts. 2 6 It has been suggested that when an airport is established, the surrounding area might very well be considered an "airport use
district" for the protection and'preservation of which valid zoning regula2
tions could be promulgated. 7
It may well be decided that existing obstructions can be removed only
upon the payment of compensation for the damage caused, and still reasonable zoning laws and ordinances upheld which impose uncompensatory restrictions against the future use of surrounding property in the interest of preventing hazards to air travel. The ultimate decision on such zoning requirements
may be strongly influenced by the reasonableness of the zoning requirements,
the circumstances under which they are imposed and the effect upon property values. The following are potent factors favoring validity:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

Airport established in a vacant area of, relatively low value;
A uniform maximum height set within a designated area. When
it becomes necessary to restrict structures below that height because
of proximity to the airport-the further restriction is achieved
through eminent domain. The maximum height should represent a
reasonably adequate use of the land in that area.
Zoning board established to permit variances from requirements
where public interest warrants.
Zoning only against certain types of generally obnoxious uses of
land, e. g., heavy industries, erection of towers and smokestacks.
LEE A. FREEMAN.*

Transcontinental Airline-What Constitutes "Doing Business" by a
Foreign Corporation for the Purpose of Service of Process.-[New York]
Suit was brought in New York against United Air Lines Transport Corporation in three separate proceedings to move for alleged wrongful death and,
presumably, injury through negligence. Two cases arose in the state courts'
2
and one in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York.
24.

C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Com'rs, 200 U. S. 561, 592 (1906) ; State

v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 147 AtI. 294 (1929) (zoning regulations promote the
"welfare and prosperity of the community * * * and aid in Its community
development").
25. Hesse v. Rath, supra, note 7; Wichita v. Clapp, supra, note 7.
26. M4cQuillin Mun. Corps (2nd ed., 1928) Vol. III, Secs. 1025-1053 and
1939 Cumulative Supplement.
27. Report, supra, note 2, pp. 17-18.
28. Zoning ordinance held unconstitutional by Attorney General of Michigan in an opinion addressed to the Governor on June 24, 1937. C. C. H. Aviat on Law Service, Par. 1817.
4 Of the Chicago Bar..

1. Dineen, et al. v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation (1938)
166
Misc. 422, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 567 ; Jensen et al. V. United Air Lines Transport

Corporation (.1938) 235 C. C. H. Aviation Law Service Par. 3055-Reversed,
(1938) 255 App. Div. 611, 8 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 374, leave to appeal to Court of
Appeals granted, 10 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 413.
2. Gross, as admx. v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation (1939)
235 C. C. H. Aviation Law Service, Par. 3058, U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. N. Y.
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The facts were: United, a Delaware corporation, was engaged in the business of transporting passengers, express, and mail by air, having its principal
place of business at Chicago, Illinois.

Its airlines crossed or were operative

in Utah and Nevada, among other states. It was not authorized to do business,
nor did it cross or operate in New York, although on occasion it used an
airport on Long Island, New York, when the Newark, New Jersey airport
.could not be used-Newark being its regular port. United advertised New
York City as its eastern terminus. It rented a business office and a passenger

station in New York City. Its name was listed in the regular building, telephone, and city directories of that .city. Its employees in that city were
largely engaged in soliciting business, selling tickets to passengers both at its
office and at a separate ticket office in a New York City hotel, routing

passengers, checking baggage, and arranging for their transportation to the
airport by independent bus concerns. It had a bank account in New York
City and owned the furniture and equipment in its offices. The summonses
were presumably served upon some agent of the defendant in New York.
In the Dineen case, the cause of action arose out of an airplane accident
in Nevada. Whether it was a death, or personal injury case and of what
state the plaintiffs were residents or citizens does not clearly appear. A
motion by defendant to set aside the service of summons was granted upon
the ground that defendant was not doing sufficient business in 'New York
to give the courts of that state jurisdiction of the suit.
In the Jensen case, cause of action.for wrongful death arose out of an
airplane accident in Utah. Suit was brought in a New York state court by
a brother and sisters of the decedent. One plaintiff was a resident.of Minnesota, and the other, a resident of New York. A motion by the defendant
to set aside the service of summons was granted by the trial court on the
grounds that the defendant was not doing business in New York and that to
permit suit in New. York would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. This was reversed by the Appellate Division.
In the Gross case, cause of action for wrongful death arose out of an
airplane accident in Utah. Suit was brought in a United States court in
New York.by the administratrix of the decedent. Of what state the plaintiff
was a resident or citizen 'does not appear. A motion by the defendant to
set aside the service of summons was denied on the grounds that the de.fendant was engaged in business in New.York, that such suit did not violate
due process of law or unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
The plethora of legal questions and problems raised by these cases and
the wealth of .material present in them 'for comment is apparent from the
statement of facts. This comment, however, is limited to the sole question
of what constitutes "doing business" in the State of New York for the
purpose of securing service of process on a transcontinental airline foreign
to New York.3 The cases considered are limited largely to decisions of the
'New York Courts, and the Supreme Court of the. United States.
There appears to be' no provision in the Civil Practice Act of New
:York 4 dealing with service of process upon foreign corporations or- requiring
that a foreign corporation be "doing business" within the state before they
can be subjected to the jurisdiction'of New York courts. That requirement,
3 See McGowan, "Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce," 33
Law Review 875 (1939).
Illinois
4. 'Cahill's
New York Practice Act (6th Ed.) 1931 and supplementsparticularly See. 229.
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however, has become well settled by judicial decisions in New York and
elsewhere.5 There is, however, a wide divergence of opinion as to what
.constitutes "doing business" (or the equivalent)-a divergence which makes
almost hopeless any attempt to rationalize, collate and classify the apparently
conflicting cases. Besides, this intangible "doing business" is not always
stated that way. 0 Many of these attempts to define or better express the
meaning of "doing business" seem to do little more than either define the
phrase in terms of itself, or introduce other and equally vague terms which
are either undefined or undefinable.
There are a few points, though, that despite the vagueness and uncertainty of the field of inquiry as a whole may be stated with some degree of
certainty and agreement. It is generally accepted that: (1) it is difficult, if
not impossible, to lay down any general rule as to what "doing business"
means for this purpose-each case must largely depend upon its own facts
and be decided thereon;7 (2) the activities of a foreign corporation within
a state must not be merely casual, occasional, or temporary, but must be a
systematic and regular course of conduct, and this with some reasonable degree
of permanence and continuity;8 (3) a lesser degree or amount of activities
is sufficient to constitute the "doing of business" for purposes of service of
process and jurisdiction of the courts, than is required for corporation licensing statutes or franchise and taxing statutes of a state-activities that may
not be sufficient to bring a foreign corporation under the latter type of
statutes may be entirely sufficient to bring it within the jurisdiction of the
courts and make it amenable to process;9 and (4) the mere solicitation of
orders or business by a foreign corporation in a state, uithout more, does not
constitute "doing business" therein to make it amenable to process-if there
is coupled with such solicitation, and resulting therefrom, a continuous, regular, and systematic flow of goods (and presumably passengers, also, in a
transportation business) into or out of the state, then the activities do constitute "doing business" and do make the corporation amenable to process
therein 0
5. Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company (1907) 205
U. S. 530: St. Louis. Southwestern Railway Company of Texas v. Alexander
(1912) 227 U. S. 218; International Harvester Company, etc. v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky (1914) 234 U. S. 579; Bank of America v. 'Whitney Central National Bank (1923) 261 U. S. 171 ; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Company (1917)
220 N. Y. 259.
6. In an effort to help clarify the matter and perhaps phrase it more
happily, it has sometimes been said that: "the business must be of such nature
and character as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected
itself to the local jurisdiction, and Is . . . present within the state:" Peoples
Tobacco Company, Limited v. American Tobacco Company (1918) 246 U. S. 79,
or "The essential thing Is that the corporation shall have come into the State.
When once it is here, it may be served; . . ." Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Company, supra, or . . . "the business must be such in character and extent as
to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected Itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which It is served . . .:" St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas v. Alexander, supra.
7. Peoples Tobacco Company, Limited v. American Tobacco Company,
supra; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas v. Alexander, supra.
8. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Company, supra; Hutchinson et al. v. C ase
and Gilbert (1930) C. C. A. 2nd 45 F. (2d) 139; International Harvester Company, etc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, supra; Hartstein, et at. v. Seidenbach's, Inc. (1927) 129 Misc. 687. 222 N. Y. Supp. 404; Pittsburgh and Shawmut
Coal Co. v. State (1922) 118 Misc. 50, 192 N. Y. 310.
9. Ibid.
10. Green v. Chicago, Burlington amd Quincy Railroad Company, supra;
Peoples Tobacco Company, Limited v. American Tobacco Company, supra;
International Harvester Company, etc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, supra;
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Company, supra; Maxfleld v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co.
(1934) C. C. A. 8th 70 F. (2d) 982; McKeon v. P. J. McGotvan and Sons (1930)
229 App. Div. 668. 242 N. Y. Supp. 700; Lillibridge, Inc. v. Johnson Bronze Co.
(1927) 220 App. Div. 573, 222 N. Y. Supp. 130.
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Among other facts, or their absence, which have from time .to time borne
more or less weight with the courts in deciding whether the corporation was
or was not so "doing business" have been: the maintenance of a branch or
local office, the maintenance of a local bank account, the listing of the corporation in local building, telephone or city directories, the presence of corporate
property within the state, the residence of corporate officers or directors
within the state, the keeping of corporate books, stationery, supplies, etc., in
the state, and the authority of, its agents in the state to accept payment for
goods, make settlement of claims, etc. But no one of these facts has in any
particular case been controlling. It is the combination of many separate
factual situations which has brought the result. Like many parts of the field
of constitutional law and particularly of' "due process," and of tort law and
particularly of "negligence,"-it seems easier to define the term "doing
business" by negation, by saying what it is not and that certain things do not
constitute "doing business," than by affirmative definition. Precedents in this
field of law, though of value in assisting to point the way to decision and in
suggesting the things to which attention should be directed, can seldom, if
ever, it seems be said to be decisive in any case. As one court has perhaps
aptly remarked: . . . "It is quite impossible to establish any rule from the
decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft across the morass . . ."11
In the present cases there are facts and factors that can be used on both
sides of the argument and some of these opposing factors are sufficiently
substantial to warrant a reasonable judgment either way. But bearing in
mind that the jurisdiction of the New York courts in a civil suit over a
foreign corporation was involved rather than the meaning of "doing business"
under corporate statutes requiring franchise and license taxes-and that, for
that reason, a lesser degree of activity by the corporation would be sufficientand bearing in mind also that there are, necessarily, other things involved ifl
running an airline besides just flying planes; that the activities of defendant
in New York doubtless constituted an important link in the totality of defendant's operation of its airlines, in the writer's judgment the factors indicating "doing business" in New York by defendant outweigh and are more
persuasive than the opposing factors.
CHARLES

G.

BRIGGLE, JR.*

DIGESTS
Airplane Collision with Automobile on Runway-Evidence of Negligence of Municipal Airport Owner in Failing to Keep Runways Clear,
[California] Plaintiff, while landing at the Clover Field Airport (owned and
operated by the City of Santa Monica), collided with an automobile driven
on the runway. Action against the city for damages. There was substantial evidence that automobiles had repeatedly driven on runways; that the city
had been warned of the danger involved; that no proper fences or watchmen
or other preventive devices were maintained. The lowir court non-suited the
plaintiff. Held: City acting in a proprietary capacity and, therefore, liable
for negligence. It is the duty of airport owner to protect users of the field
from reasonably anticipated dangers introduced by the negligence of third
parties. In view of the fact that the city did nothing to prevent use of runways by automobiles, and since there was such use generally, the city should
have anticipated the danger which caused the instant accident. The ques11. Hutchinson, et at. v. Chase and Gilbert, supra n. 7.
* Of the Illinois Bar.
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tion of negligence should be left for the jury. Pignet v. City of Santa Monica,
84 Pac. (2d) 166. (Cal. App.) Nov. 17, 1938.
L. A. F.
Bailment-Liability of Bailee for Damage to Plane-Negligence in
Deviating from Agreed Charter and Failure to Switch on Reserve Fuel
Tank.- [New York] Plane hired for one half hour of acrobatics, with a
gasoline supply adequate for 45 minutes and a reserve tank of 3 gallons.
The plane, however, was flown off the field and the gasoline supply exhaused
in 40 minutes. Defendant, an experienced pilot, failed to switch over to the
reserve fuel and made a forced landing with consequent damage to the plane.
Action to recover for such damage. Held: The transaction between the
parties was a bailment. The general rules of tort and bailment law related
to land vehicles applies equally to aircraft. As such, defendant was obligated to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the plane and since he
was a bailee for hire, and the accident was one which, in the ordinary course,
would not happen but for want of proper care, the burden was upon him
to prove that he had taken reasonable and prudent precautions. Defendant
found guilty of negligence for taking a longer trip than agreed, and for
failing to properly use the reserve fuel tank-especially since he was an
experienced pilot.
Several interesting inquiries are presented. Does the court hold an experienced pilot to a higher degree of care than an inexperienced pilot? If
so, what would be the practical effect of such a doctrine? Is that another
variation of the "reasonable" or "ordinary" man criteria? Is a 45 minute
gas supply sufficient when a plane is chartered for acrobatic uses? Would
the speed with which the plane is operated affect the time for which the
fuel will last? While the court applied the tort and bailment principles developed on land-does an automobilist have to worry about a gas supply in
the prevention of accidents? Braman-Johnson Flying Service, Inc. v. Thomson, 167 Misc. 167, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 602 (Mun. Ct. of City of N. Y., April 12,
1938), C. C. H. Aviation Law Service, Par. 909.
L. A. F.
Bailment-Liability of City for Negligence of Employe Around Airport.-[Michigan]
Plaintiff owned a plane which was leased to Helm,
who, in turn, agreed with the City of Flint to manage its airport (including
the collection of rentals, maintenance of beacons and logging of traffic) in
return for $50 per month and the use of a hangar for the storage of the
leased plane. Thereafter, the city received federal aid to improve the airport and Helm was transferred to the CWA rolls but continued to act as
manager of the airport, performing all the functions previously performed.
One of the city employes, while trying to start a city tractor stored in the
same hangar with plaintiff's plane, caused a fire which destroyed the plane.
The case was submitted to the jury with instructions that a gratuitous bailment existed and the city was only liable for gross negligenec. Verdict
rendered for plaintiff but the court granted defendant's motion non obstante
veredicto. Held: Judgment reversed. A bailment for the mutual benefit
of both parties existed. Defendant's employe was obliged to exercise ordinary care. The case should have been submitted to the jury on that basis.
Godfrey v.. City of Flint, 284 Mich. 291, 279 N. W. 516, May 4, 1938.
L. A. F.
Death from Revolving Propeller-Negligence-Proximate CauseScope of Employment.-[Oklahoma]
A plane was borrowed from defendant to demonstrate the use of electric light signs for night advertising.
The battery in the plane was changed from a 6 volt to a 12 volt battery to
carry the additional load of the electric signs. The plane was piloted by a
regular employe of defendant but outside his regular working hours and
duties. A fire was discovered in one of the wings, after the flight was
completed, caused by the excess voltage sent through the navigation lights.
The pilot-and demonstrator proceeded to extinguish the fire and were suc-
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ceeding when plaintiff's intestate, a night watchman at the defendant's air
school, came rushing out of a hangar with a fire extinguisher, ran into the
revolving propeller, and was killed. Plaintiff claimed negligence due to
improper use of the 12 volt battery; failure to provide blocks against the
wheels of the landing gear to stop the plane; failure to shut off the engine.
Held: The plane was idling in a stationary position at the time of the accident. For plaintiff to succeed in the action it must be found that the pilot
was acting in the scope of his employment and that the pilot's negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury. The pilot was not acting within the
scope of his employment-and the alleged acts of negligence did not proximately cause the accident. The plaintiff failed to prove "primary negligence"
of defendant. Intestate himself was negligent. He voluntarily sought to
assist in putting out the fire and negligently ran into the revolving propeller.
Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 Pac. (2d) 1096, January
11, 1938.
L. A. F.
Workmen's Compensation-Action for Damages Denied Since Plaintiff Covered by Workmen's Compensation.-[Illinois]
Action against
employer for injuries caused by the escape of carbon monoxide during a
flight, resulting from employer's negligence. Employe covered by Workmen's
Compensation Act, and entitled to compensation for his injuries, therefore,
action against employer for damages would not lie. Schnell v. National Air
Transport, 296 Ill. App. 641, 16 N. E. (2d) 191, June 29, 1938.
L. A. F.
Workmen's Compensation-Private Pilot Not a Part of Regular Business Covered by Policy.-[California] Employer engaged in business of
raising horses and for that purpose maintained a stable. A workmen's compensation insurance policy was written by Pacific Indemnity covering all employes connected with such business operations. Later the employer purchased
a plane for his private use and pleasure, hired a pilot therefor, and secured
compensation insurance with the London Guarantee for the pilot. The pilot
was killed, and at commission hearings the London Guarantee demanded that
the Pacific Indemnity share the loss. The commission found that evidence
failed to establish an intent to limit the coverage of the Pacific Indemnity
policy and, therefore, rendered an award against that company. Held: Uncontroverted evidence was introduced to prove that parties did not intend
to include coverage for the pilot in the Pacific Indemnity policy. If necessary,
policy may be reformed to accord with true intent of parties. Commission
award against Pacific Indemnity annulled. Pacific Indemnity Company v.
Industrial Accident Commission of California, London Guarantee & Accident
Co., 84 Pac. (2d) 793 (Cal. App.) Nov. 28, 1938.
L. A. F.

